Diaspora of Islamic Cultures: Continuity and Change by Moghissi, Haideh
Research Report
Diaspora of Islamic Cultures:
Continuity and Change
Haideh Moghissi
Abstract
This paper, drawing upon an ongoing research project
funded by Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC) and the Ford Foundation, in-
troduces the main ideas and themes that inform the study
of changing gender and family relations among four dis-
placed communities of Islamic cultures (Iranian, Afghan,
Palestinian, and Pakistani). For members of each group,
three sets of “circumstances” are analyzed – an indivi-
dual’s experience in the home and host country, together
with an examination of socio-economic conditions and po-
licies in the host. In addition to these social and economic
factors, in particular, it will focus on the ways in which so-
cial class, gender, and religious commitments affect an in-
dividual’s experience when they move. It is argued that
gender significantly impacts new migrants’ experience
and how they feel about their “home” country. One of our
main hypotheses is that under pressures of a rapid, often
difficult, social and cultural transformation, changing gen-
der dynamics in the new country can lead to a new under-
standing among partners – or, alternatively, to heightened
tension, with severely damaging effects, particularly for
women and children. Culturally, when family under-
standings collapse, this process may be accompanied by an
effort to find religious justification for gender inequality.
Then, a connection can be seen between difficulties in the
new country, the efforts of conservative men to reclaim the
dominance they once enjoyed in their countries of origin,
and give it a religious justification. Hence, the revival, in
the diaspora, of conservative Islamic practice and belief.
Résumé
Inspiré d’un projet de recherche toujours en cours – pro-
jet financé conjointement par le Conseil de recherches en
sciences humaines du Canada, CRSH, et la Fondation
Ford – cet article présente les thèmes majeurs et les idées
principales sous-jacents à cette étude sur les changements
qui s’opèrent dans les relations entre membres des deux
sexes ainsi qu’au sein de la structure familiale pour qua-
tre groupes de déplacés de culture islamique – les commu-
nautés iranienne, afghane, palestinienne et pakistanaise.
Trois ensembles de « circonstances » sont analysés pour
les membres de chaque communauté : l’expérience per-
sonnelle d’un individu dans son pays d’origine et dans le
pays hôte, ainsi qu’une analyse des conditions socio-éco-
nomiques et des politiques en cours dans le pays hôte. En
plus de ces facteurs sociaux et économiques, seront aussi
examinés de plus près les façons dont l’appartenance à
une classe sociale, le fait d’être un homme ou une femme
et le degré d’attachement à la religion influent sur l’expé-
rience d’un individu lorsqu’il émigre. L’auteure soutient
que l’appartenance à un genre ou à un autre – la sexospé-
cificité - influe de façon notable sur l’expérience vécue
par les nouveaux migrants et sur leur sentiment envers
leur ‘patrie’. L’une des principales hypothèses est que,
sous la pression des transformations sociales et culturelles
qui s’opèrent rapidement – et souvent difficilement – les
changements dans la dynamique des relations entre les
deux sexes dans le nouveau pays peuvent amener une
nouvelle compréhension entre les partenaires – ou, au
contraire, contribuer à des relations interpersonnelles
plus tendues, avec des effets dommageables tout particu-
lièrement pour les femmes et les enfants. Dans un con-
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texte culturel, lorsque l’harmonie familiale se désintègre,
ce processus peut s’accompagner d’efforts pour essayer de
trouver des justifications religieuses à l’inégalité entre les
genres. On peut donc établir un lien entre les difficultés
vécues dans le nouveau pays et les efforts déployés par les
hommes conservateurs pour essayer de retrouver leur po-
sition dominante qu’ils occupaient dans leur pays d’ori-
gine, tout en lui donnant une justification religieuse. Ceci
explique la renaissance à l’intérieur de la diaspora, de
pratiques et de croyances islamiques conservatrices.
Displacement and migration are prevalent features ofthe present century. In October 2002, UNESCO’sInternational and Multicultural Policies section de-
clared that the number of migrants has more than doubled
since 1975. According to UNESCO, currently 175 million
people, that is, about 3 per cent of the world population, live
in countries in which they were not born. The experience of
diasporic  communities in  their adopted  countries raises
urgent questions of socio-cultural integration, human
rights, and security for both migrant communities and the
host societies.
This paper, drawing upon an ongoing research project
funded by Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council (SSHRC) and the Ford Foundation, introduces the
main ideas and themes that inform the study of the effects
of displacement on gender relations among four migrant
and refugee communities from Islamic cultures. The time
frame for the research would be five years (2000–05). Of
the four diasporic communities that are the focus of this
project, Iranians, Afghans, Pakistanis, and Palestinians, two
are studied in developed societies (Iranians and Pakistanis
in Canada and Britain).The other two communities, are
being studied in Canada and, in addition, in developing
Islamic states (Afghans in Iran, and Palestinians in Jordan
and in the West Bank and Gaza under social and economic
conditions arising from occupation). For members of each
group, three sets of “circumstances” are analyzed – an
individual’s experience in the home and host country, to-
gether with an examination of socio-economic conditions
and policies in the host. In addition to these social and
economic factors, we seek to demonstrate how gender si-
gnificantly impacts new migrants’ experience and how they
feel about their “home” country. That is, the challenge to
traditional ideas may present itself as a positive experience
for many (particularly younger) women, who find an op-
portunity to break from the extended family, and a relati-
vely negative one for men, who may encounter difficulty in
finding satisfying work in the new society, and whose au-
thority, dignity, and sense of self-worth may therefore be
threatened.
In this study, we use the term “diaspora” in a rather
self-explanatory fashion to refer to communities of immi-
grant, exiled, and self-exiled individuals who, despite cul-
tural, economic, and political distinctions, share the
experience of separation from home about which they have
a collective memory. An awareness of or consciousness
about  this  experience for the  expatriate  communities –
what William Safran has called “intellectualization of an
existential condition” – is central to this definitional choice.
This definition includes characteristics such as a dispersal
from an “original center" to “peripheral” places, maintai-
ning a memory about the homeland and perhaps conside-
ring it a place of eventual return, and particularly having an
underclass position in the “hostland” and a belief “that they
are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their
host country.”1 These are characteristics that are shared by
many diasporic communities.
Our study of changing gender relations and family dyna-
mics within communities of Islamic cultures seeks to show
that “diasporic consciousness” with its associated effects for
communities of Islamic cultures results more from a gra-
dually developed emotional, psychological, and inevitably
cultural detachment from the “host-land” rather than a
continued attachment to the “home-land;” and that this
might be the inevitable result of declared and/or undeclared
hostility and exclusionary practices that target diasporic
communities of Islamic cultures in Western metropolisis.
Indeed, a central effect of diasporic experience is a lasting
sense of not belonging felt by many individuals living away
from their homeland. Not-belonging or feeling out of place
can sometimes be intellectual and political. Many noncon-
formist intellectuals who do not share the cultural values,
perceptions, and/or dominant  ideologies in their home
countries may feel this sense of not belonging, regardless of
their nationality or place of residence. They feel culturally
homeless within their home, so to speak. But generally, the
sense of not belonging, or living on the margin of social and
economic life, is more profound and has more immediate
practical consequences for the groups of migrant, refugee,
and displaced communities, particularly those coming
from so-called Third World societies. This is partly related
to the host country/country of residence (racism, xenopho-
bia, and non-acceptance of difference) and partly the result
of the diasporic individuals’ and communities’ sense of
banishment or deprivation from a homeland. They feel they
have lost their historical location and heritage and are
separated  from the comforting embrace of the  familiar
culture.
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To be sure, displacement and migration involve enor-
mous changes in the lives of displaced individuals. How
these changes are processed and absorbed depend on many
factors including one’s social class, personal financial re-
sources in exile, racial location, gender, rural and urban
origin, and political views. Many studies in this area point
to the fact that the sense of emptiness and of cultural loss
and the need to construct a new framework for belonging
increase over time, at least for certain migrants. The deve-
lopment of an “identity conflict” is particularly true of the
second-generation migrants for whom, over time, “aware-
ness of differences between themselves and dominant An-
glo society may increase.”2 However, while the second
generation migrants are often able to adopt a strategy to
shift back and forth between their culture and the dominant
culture of the host country, this role shift between public
and private behaviour may not  be  as easy for  the  first
generation. Hence, over time the desire to be or to appear
the same may turn into a desire to emphasize difference. The
sense of exclusion and cultural difference, that is, a feeling
of not being accepted or at least  tolerated by the host
country, adds to the sense of isolation. Many refugees and
immigrants feel that they are expected to work harder, to
be on their most impeccable behaviour, to complain less,
and always to be grateful in their adopted home. The feeling
that they are being watched and have to prove themselves
never quite leaves them.3 One respondent in a study of Arab
women in the United States stated, “For the first six years I
tried very hard to assimilate and look and act and sound
like everyone else.” She continues that gradually she felt she
had lost herself and instead of a sense of self she had become
ashamed of herself.4 It is not uncommon for some to try to
make themselves “invisible” through changing their hair
colour or name. In my own study of the Iranian community
in Canada, I found that female respondents, in particular,
very clearly differentiate between their perceptions of the
host country, whose legal system and social services have
provided them with support and assistance to “stay on their
two feet,” as one of them told me, and their feelings about
the society (the very same society) which accepted them
with cold politeness but “never opens itself” to them; thus
she explains that she hesitates to be warm and does not
expect warmth from anyone.5
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One important question that needs to be discussed at the
outset is the ambiguity of the identity marker that is often
used to refer to individuals we define as diasporas of Islamic
cultures. Does Islam define their identity or the diasporic
experience define their Islamic cultural identity?
As is more or less known, in the West today, racism need
not be linked to “race.” Racialism no longer needs to be
linked to biology or to be theorized through “scientific
racism.” Today, racism against Muslims takes the form of
a focus on “the way of life,” on “cultural difference” be-
tween the insiders (the white Europeans) and the outsiders
(in this case, Muslims). What we are facing now, as Al-
Azmeh would argue, is three displacements in the notion
of race. “Race becomes ethnicity, then culture; the norma-
tive hierarchy and inequality gave way to representation in
terms of difference.”6 Muslims are perhaps the best example
of groups who are continuously targets of racism, without
having an identifiable marker such as colour that works
against blacks. Their religion, Islam, becomes a source of
discrimination and exclusion.
Now in this context, the point is not whether we can
identify a particular diasporic group or community as “Is-
lamic” with distinct and easily identifiable characteristics.
The point rather is that the Islamic diaspora in the West is
often a product of anti-Muslim propaganda and racism.
This is not to deny the resurgence of traditional practices,
increased religiosity and even revitalization of tribal cus-
toms among certain groups of migrants of Islamic cultures.
The point is that these are to a large extent the results of
what has been identified as a “siege mentality.” That is,
often immigrants of Islamic cultural backgrounds are enti-
rely conceptualized and their history, culture, and way of
life are understood with reference to Islam and Islam alone.
It seems Islam is the organizing force, shaping all aspects of
the societies the immigrants come from as well as their
existence in the West. Hence, the profound heterogeneity
of peoples from Muslim societies within or without the
Middle East is completely obscured. As I have said else-
where, the notion of “difference” is used as a term to draw
attention only to dissimilarities between the “Muslim” and
“Western” ways and views. It is never found to be a useful
term to note the contrast among the ways and views of
people from “Muslim” societies.7
That is to say, ethnic, regional, and class divisions be-
tween and among diasporic communities from Islamic
societies define the world views, the ways of life, the at-
tachments to the cultural practices of the homeland, and
most definitely the politics of individual migrants of Islamic
cultures. For example, there are enormous differences be-
tween the ethnic makeup and class background of Muslim
diasporic communities in Europe and their counterparts in
Canada and the United States. Muslim communities in
Britain, France, and Germany, for example, come predo-
minantly from working-class and rural backgrounds and
consist primarily of poor, unskilled or skilled migrants. The
Muslim diasporic communities in the United States and
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Canada, at least until very recently, tended to have urban,
middle-class, and professional backgrounds. Baha Abu La-
ban’s study of Muslims in Canada in the early 1980s, for
example, showed that 43 per cent of Canadian Muslims are
of Indo-Pakistani origin, over 7 per cent are of European,
mostly of British background, and over 6 per cent of North
and South American backgrounds. His study showed that
the average income among Muslim males in Canada was
substantially lower than the comparable income for non-
Muslim males, and this was despite the fact that the level of
their educational attainment exceeded the Canadian ave-
rage. Nonetheless, Muslims in Canada, Abu-Leban noted,
were “linguistically competent, relatively well placed in the
occupational structure of Canada’ and showed a high de-
gree of integration and cultural preservation.” Accordingly,
gender equity between boys and girls in Muslim communi-
ties varies directly  with socio-economic status (income,
education, and occupation).8 By contrast, as Al-Azmeh has
argued, Muslims in Bradford, England, are of rural origin
with hardly any social awareness of city life even in Pakistan
itself.9 Understandably, their rural origin explains their
social conservatism on matters such as girls’ education.
Another study of Arab Canadians in the early 1990s points
that 33 per cent of this population has a university degree
compared to 11 per cent of the general population. Also, 25
per cent of women of the population of Arab-Canadians
have attained university degrees and 32 per cent were re-
ported as working outside the home.10 Also according to
Statistics Canada, 48 per cent of Iranians in Canada have a
university degree and 17.5 per cent have attained a non-
university diploma. Women constitute 38 per cent of this
population. Only 18 per cent of Iranians were reported as
unemployed in 1996, 15.9 per cent of men and 23.7 per cent
of women.11
These differences point to one important fact: that Islam
is not a meta-culture bounding all immigrants from Islamic
societies together. That is why, for example, Arabs, Iran-
ians, and Muslims did not act uniformly during the affair
concerning Salman Rushdi’s affair arising from Ayatollah
Khomeini’s fatwa. While a large group of Iranian intellec-
tuals in exile signed a petition condemning the fatwa, o-
thers, including many Middle Eastern and Western
scholars, coyly supported the fatwa, using “different cultu-
ral standards” as an excuse. Worse, there were several pro-
fatwa rallies by the Muslim community of Indo-Pakistani
origin in Bradford, England. However, the Western media
that made extensive use of these rallies to reinforced hostile,
racist perceptions about Muslims as the ultimate Other
made no mention of the anti-fatwa protest.
The  point is that the notions of “cultural difference,
formulate and frame ‘the discursive boundary’ of SELF and
OTHER, civilized and uncivilized....[a] French woman
with a scarf is chic, but a Muslim woman with a scarf is a
threat to civilization. The very ‘noise and smell’ of Muslims,
as Jacques Chirac once declared, drives decent and civilized
French people  understandably crazy.”12 With respect to
diasporic Muslim communities in the West, we suggest
that, in many cases, the identifiable cultural characteristics
often take shape in response to the recurrent Islamophobia
of media and governments in the West and the construction
of shameless racist imagery about Islam, about Muslim
women, and about the Muslim way of life which target
specifically diasporic communities.
What we seek to examine in our study is, how does the
“siege mentality” affect the relationship between the dias-
poric communities and the host society and, consequently,
the gender relations and family dynamics among the com-
munities of Islamic culture? These research questions are
based on a premise that, in diasporic communities that are
the targets of racism, gradually a consciousness develops
which is expressed in several ways: a resentment against the
dominant culture and its thought of as aggressively, but
indirectly, pushing its values on all those considered as
Other; a return to cultural practices with a claim of authen-
ticity; often associated with diasporic experience is a sense
of self-righteousness  which turns into  “moral bookkee-
ping,” to use David Stannard’s term, and leads to “guilt-
tripping” others. Also, depending on race, class, and
gender, it often leads to a retreat into a particular lifestyle
and a closure and inability to move beyond self/communi-
ty-centred concerns and commitments. That is, politics
becomes auto-referential, primarily or even solely focusing
on personal and experiential existence. Related to this per-
sonalized politics is hostility and non-acceptance of views,
attitudes, and practices which fall beyond the frontiers of
the indigenous culture, which are considered as belonging
to the “outside” world. In the case of Muslim communities,
for example, one may observe the gradual development of
unwarranted loyalties and uncritical acceptance of male-
defined cultural norms and values, and even the emergence
of a loyalty to the same home government whose policies
drove this population out of the homeland. One of the
unfortunate consequences of this psychological de-
tachment from the host society is that the individual mi-
grants, instead of joining social struggles in the host country
to establish a more humane society, turn on themselves and
wrestle, obsessively, with challenges to their culture and
collective identity. In this way, cultural resistance may sup-
press individuality, the right to choice, and critical thinking
for individual community members. They insist “that they
are Muslim, their children are Muslim, without making an
attempt to define what that means in the Western environ-
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ment where they are in minority and they refuse to accept,
or relate to, issues facing their communities... such as child
sexual abuse and spousal abuse.”13
In this context, racism and social and cultural pressures
from the host country can create among ethno-racial mi-
norities of Islamic cultures grounds for a solidarity and
bonding that would not necessarily exist in the home country.
The construction of a specific ineluctible cultural identity
can limit understanding and the ability to act in a self-
empowering way and can make it difficult for a people to
recognize, pursue, or appreciate alternative moral and social
goals. That is to say, there is a close link between the
formation of identity and the sorts of moral and social
responsibility that individuals take within their family and
their communities.
The point of departure in the study of changing gender
relations and family dynamics among diasporic communi-
ties of Islamic cultures is that relations within the family are
affected by a complex web of class, ethnic, gender, religious,
and regional factors and not simply by pre-existing cultural
values  imported from originating countries. Hence, the
vision of the homeland, which affects individuals’ readiness
to adapt to a new country and defines the attachment to
cultural and religious values (including values that are hos-
tile to gender justice and equality within the family), is
compatible with and differentiated by variables which are
external to the diasporic communities themselves. The fee-
ling that they are being watched and have to prove them-
selves never quite leaves them.
The commonality of the experience which allow us the
use of the term “diaspora of Islamic cultures,” and which
has inspired this project, may lie in the fact that pressures
of displacement and the increasing, and often openly hos-
tile, stereotypes about migrants of Islamic cultures pushes
a substantial number of individuals in each community to
barricade themselves behind an ancestral cultural heritage
which reinforces gender inequalities. Indeed, racism and
the sharp decline in class position that many migrants
experience may have a direct impact on gender relations.
That is, they may reinforce sexist values and patriarchal
power relations within a diasporic community. The pain
and the anger caused by anti-Muslim and anti-Islam racism
encourage members of the diaspora family to take refuge in
their own culture, indeed to value the culture in its totality
and to suppress critical positions and “disharmony” in its
different forms, including challenges to cultural traditions
coming from youth and women. In this context, sustaining
the native culture and identity manifests itself in maintai-
ning beliefs and practices pertaining to men-women rela-
tionships within the family and to culturally acceptable
masculine-feminine values and roles.
Our goal in this study is not to make apologies and to
excuse the manipulation of culture, tradition, and religion
by conservative men who are determined to maintain the
structures and relations of male dominance. Rather, we
hope to identify the forces from which conservatives in the
diaspora draw strength. We suggest that a chilling reception
by the host country encourages the diasporic communities
to cling to a folkloric and reified “Islamic” identity, walling
themselves off from the dominant culture. Instead of
seeking a positive reckoning of where they are and what
they might do, they may refrain from interacting with the
host community and from making a positive contribution
to its betterment. That is to say, structural racism of the host
society and indigenous patriarchy merge to create a need
for cultural belonging, an ethnic identity which is mascu-
line and which struggles to regenerate the traditional status
quo. Sexism and moralistic attitudes are given cultural force
and are camouflaged, suppressing expressions of indivi-
duality and individual choice.14 This leads to an idealization
of “Muslim family” in a desperate attempt to keep age and
gender hierarchies intact.
To conduct this research, we have chosen a multiple
method combining two major methodological perspecti-
ves, the comparative and the systemic. A comparative
method is needed to examine the similarities and differen-
ces in gender and family relations among several immigrant
and refugee communities in different host countries. At the
same time, the study adopts a systemic method which
provides a comprehensive framework within which dif-
ferent parameters affecting the behaviour of individuals
and communities can be studied in a uniform and balanced
manner. The migrant communities examined in this re-
search are each considered as a system. These systems cons-
titute a relatively integrated whole with some degree of
cohesion. They consist of a set of interrelated sub-systems
(individuals, families and institutions) and operate within
a larger environment, the supra-system. The sub-systems for
each community include families and individuals, as well
as institutions such as religious organizations, workplaces,
community media, and schools. Within these sub-systems
and in the community as a whole, individuals are differen-
tiated on the basis of factors such as gender, age, class,
education, and occupation or profession. These factors are
considered both in the country of origin before exit and in
host societies. Finally, at a higher level, the supra-system
consists of factors including the culture and social norms
of the host society, the economic situation, and government
policies. Open in structure, each system interacts with its
sub-systems and supra-systems, is affected by them, and
influences them. Thus, taken together, the study considers
factors influencing the behaviour of individuals and com-
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munities at three levels (system, sub-system, and supra-sys-
tem) and relates these factors in a dynamic manner. We
believe that only by using this methodology can we com-
pare diverse communities in different countries. Hence,
each diaspora community (the sub-total of the sampled
individuals forming the statistical “population” of that
community in a particular host country) will be correlated
with different “circumstances” that may affect different (or
similar) behaviour.
We have categorized these circumstances under three
groups. The “situation of individual at origin” involves
variables such as social background/family status, urban/
rural origin, level of education, type of occupation, and
income in the home country. These are in turn correlated
with two variables of gender and age. The “situation of
individual in host” involves variables such as type of occu-
pation, education, and income in the host country, again
correlated with gender and age. The “conditions/policies at
host” consists of mostly independent variables such as social,
cultural, political, and economic conditions of the host, and
government policies, particularly in relation to immigra-
tion and refugees. The research instruments we are using
this study include oral interviews with  immigrants  and
refugees as well as with social workers and experts and
informants in the community: questionnaires, administe-
red in the communities; content analysis of community
publications; and census data analysis.
By identifying forces which prevent or hinder change in
gender roles, this research can suggest interventions that
may reduce the incidence of conflict and tensions within
families. In particular, it tries to show how the cultural
inheritance of displaced populations intersects with larger
political and economic forces, as discrimination, racist at-
titudes, and social and cultural pressures create grounds for
solidarity and bonding  among  ethno-racial groups that
might not otherwise exist. These findings should be of value
in considering the role and mission of government and
non-governmental agencies which work in sustained con-
tact with immigrants and refugees.
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